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The Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm says that an event is
overall harmful for a subject iff it makes things go worse for the subject, on
the whole, than they otherwise would have gone for the subject. Formally:
CCA An event e is overall harmful for a subject S iff S is better off in
the closest possible world where e doesn’t occur than S is as a
result of e.1
CCA is an attractive account of harm. It has many virtues and many advantages
over its competitors. But I won’t explore those features here. Ben Bradley gives
a nice summary of them, though he ultimately rejects CCA (2012: 396–7, 401).
In this paper, I’ll reply to two objections to CCA that haven’t been adequately
addressed in the literature. Some critics think that certain omission and preemp-
tion cases raise obviously fatal problems for it. I’ll argue that they’re wrong.2
First, a caveat: CCA is about overall harm, which is different from pro
tanto harm. I’ll explain this distinction later and use it to show that preemption
cases don’t raise obviously fatal problems for CCA. Until then, my discussion
will be confined to overall harm and I’ll leave the “overall” implicit.
1 My informal statement of the view is similar to Bradley’s (2012: 396). My formal state-
ment is similar to Klocksiem’s (2012: 287). Klocksiem and I use the standard possible
worlds analysis of counterfactuals (cf. Lewis 1973; Stalnaker 1968). On this view, a
counterfactual p h ? q is true iff q is true in the most similar— i.e., “closest”— possi-
ble world where p is true (or closest set of worlds where p is true if there’s no uniquely
closest world). This analysis will help us to more accurately assess the account’s impli-
cations in the cases that I’ll discuss.
2 For other objections see Boonin (2014), Bradley (2012), Feit (2015), Gardner (2015),
Hanser (2008), Klocksiem (2012), Purves (forthcoming), Shiffrin (1999, 2012), and
Tadros (2014). For responses to some of these objections see the works by Boonin,
Bradley, Feit, Gardner, Klocksiem, Purves, and Tadros. Klocksiem and Feit offer espe-
cially interesting responses to the objections that I’ll consider. Though their responses
are on the right track, their responses aren’t entirely adequate, as we’ll see.




Ben Bradley objects to CCA with the following case.
Golf Clubs: Batman buys golf clubs, intending to give them to Robin.
That would have made Robin happy. But the Joker convinces Batman to
keep the clubs for himself.
Bradley objects to CCA as follows.
[CCA] entails that Batman has harmed Robin, because Robin would have
been better off if Batman had not kept the clubs. But it seems implausible
to say that Batman has harmed Robin. Merely failing to benefit someone
does not constitute harming that person. (2012: 397)
I disagree with Bradley’s characterization of CCA’s implications. I think he’s
right that CCA entails that Batman harms Robin, at least if the details of the case
are spelled out in the right way (see below). But he’s wrong about why.
First, CCA doesn’t entail that merely failing to benefit a subject harms the sub-
ject. If it did, it would entail that Batman harms Robin for every way he can and
doesn’t benefit Robin. And it doesn’t entail that. As Matthew Hanser points out, it
does so only if non-occurrences are events, and they aren’t obviously events (2008:
427; cf. Boonin 2014: 53, n2). Even when there are events related to such non-
occurrences, CCA doesn’t obviously entail that those events are harmful. Suppose
that Batman can benefit Robin by giving him the Batmobile. Suppose that he con-
siders doing so and decides not to. CCA doesn’t obviously entail that the decision
harms Robin. Robin wouldn’t obviously have been better off had Batman not
decided that. The closest possible world where Batman doesn’t decide that isn’t
obviously one where he gives Robin the Batmobile. It might be one where he never
decides, say because he remains indecisive or just forgets to decide. Or it might be
one where he doesn’t consider giving Robin the Batmobile at all.3
I’ll return to these issues later. For now, just notice that Golf Clubs is
different from the Batmobile case. Golf Clubs has a special feature: Batman
intended to give Robin the clubs and changed his mind. Let’s assume for
3 In other words, the following counterfactual might be true: If Batman hadn’t decided not
to give Robin the Batmobile, it would have been because he didn’t consider giving
Robin the Batmobile at all. An anonymous referee notes that counterfactuals like this
pose certain difficulties. So-called backtracking counterfactuals are claims about how
things at earlier times would be different if things at later times were different. David
Lewis (1979) says that we typically assume that what happens earlier doesn’t depend
counterfactually on what happens later. Backtracking counterfactuals come out false on
this assumption. However, he notes that in some contexts there are good reasons to
abandon the assumption and count certain backtracking counterfactuals as true (1979:
456–7). I’m suggesting that cases like the one above might be like that. The discussion
in section 2 will suggest some reasons for thinking this, though I won’t explicitly discuss
backtracking counterfactuals there.
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now that he would have given Robin the clubs had he not changed his
mind. If so, CCA entails this:
M Batman’s changing his mind harms Robin.
Given our assumption, I think that M is true. Here’s an argument for it. The
Joker’s actions harm Robin. They harm him by preventing him from getting
a benefit, which they do by getting Batman to change his mind. If Batman’s
changing his mind doesn’t harm Robin, the Joker’s actions don’t harm
Robin either. But since the Joker’s actions do harm Robin, Batman’s chang-
ing his mind does too.
Here’s a formal statement of the argument.
1) If Batman’s changing his mind doesn’t harm Robin, the Joker’s
actions don’t harm Robin.
2) The Joker’s actions harm Robin.
3) So, M is true: Batman’s changing his mind harms Robin.4
There are two ways to object to this argument, which I’ll consider in turn. You
could reject premise 1 and argue that only the Joker’s actions harm Robin. Or
you could reject premise 2 and deny that the Joker’s actions harm Robin.
2. Two Objections to the Argument for M
Consider the first objection. If you think that only the Joker’s actions harm
Robin, you must appeal to a relevant difference between the Joker’s actions and
Batman’s actions to defend your view. Here’s one difference that you might
appeal to: the Joker’s actions interfere with someone else’s intentions, but Bat-
man’s actions interfere with his own prior intentions. This difference doesn’t
show that only the Joker’s actions harm Robin. Consider why the Joker’s
actions harm Robin, if they do. If they harm him, it’s because of how they affect
him: they prevent him from getting a benefit.5 Given our assumption that Bat-
4 Boonin (2014: 53, n2) gives a different argument for a similar conclusion. I find his
argument plausible too.
5 Preventing subjects from getting benefits can harm them. Suppose a subject will die
without a certain medication, which you’re bringing her. I steal it from you. Conse-
quently, she doesn’t get it and dies. But she would have lived had I not stolen it. My
stealing the medication harms her (cf. Hanser 2008: 427–8; Shiffrin 2012: 368). In light
of this example, you might reply that preventing subjects from getting only certain kinds
of benefits is harmful for them. You might say that preventing a subject’s life from
being saved harms the subject but preventing Robin from getting the golf clubs doesn’t
harm him. I’ll address this objection when discussing the second objection to my argu-
ment for M.
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man would have given Robin the clubs had he not changed his mind, Batman’s
changing his mind affects Robin in the same way. Indeed, the Joker’s actions
have that effect because Batman’s changing his mind has that effect. And it’s
the effect that makes these events harmful for Robin if they’re harmful for
him. Since both the Joker’s actions and Batman’s actions affect Robin in this
way, both harm him if either does. So appealing to the above difference
doesn’t vindicate the first objection.
Here’s another difference that an objector might appeal to. The Joker
actively prevents Robin from getting a benefit, but Batman only passively
refrains from benefitting Robin. Justin Klocksiem (2012) actually defends
CCA against the omission objection by appealing to this difference and
arguing that CCA doesn’t entail that agents like Batman harm agents like
Robin. If he’s right, my argument for M fails. So, let’s consider what he
says about the active/passive distinction.
Klocksiem uses a case like Golf Clubs to explain his take on the distinction’s
significance. His case is simpler, so I’ll use it to explain his view. Then I’ll dis-
cuss the implications that his discussion has for Golf Clubs. Here’s his case.
Hat: Archie buys a hat for Jughead, but then decides to keep it for himself.
Klocksiem grants that getting the Hat would make Jughead better off (let’s
assume that getting it would make Jughead happy). But Klocksiem thinks
that Archie’s changing his mind doesn’t harm Jughead. Here’s why.
[W]e tend to view structurally identical cases differently, depending on
whether the agent was active or passive, because this affects our intuitions
about what would have happened had things been otherwise. So in [Hat],
we assume that Archie was going to refrain from giving the hat to Jug-
head, conclude that Archie did not affect Jughead’s welfare, and classify it
as a mere failure to benefit. (2012: 294)
The thought here seems to be this: the fact that Archie changed his mind
suggests that his intention was particularly unstable. His reasons for chang-
ing his mind suggest that he was unlikely to follow through on his intention
and give Jughead the hat. So the closest world where he doesn’t change his
mind is probably still one where he doesn’t give Jughead the hat. Klock-
siem thinks that these observations help to illustrate a more general point.
In general, whether an event constitutes a harm or a mere failure to benefit
depends heavily on contextual details that determine whether or not the
relevant possible world in which S is better off is very near the [actual]
world. If the world in which S is better off is very similar to the [actual]
world, and so an intervention was required to prevent that world from
coming about, we are more likely to regard [such an intervention] as a
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harm. If the world in which S is better off is not very similar to the
[actual] world, and so an intervention was required to bring it about, we
are likely to regard [omitting to so intervene] as a [mere] failure to benefit.
(2012: 294–5)
Klocksiem’s take on all of this is ingenious, but not fully satisfactory. I’ll
explain.
Note that we’re not told what Archie’s reasons for changing his mind
are. If they’re predominantly selfish, it’s plausible to say that Archie’s inten-
tion was unstable. Such reasons seem to reveal deeper facts about Archie
that make it unlikely that he’d follow through on his intention and give Jug-
head the hat. I agree with Klocksiem about such cases: CCA doesn’t obvi-
ously entail that Archie harms Jughead in such cases. This is because the
closest possible world where Archie doesn’t change his mind isn’t obvi-
ously one where he gives Jughead the hat. But things can change if
Archie’s reasons are different. Suppose that Archie meets a pretentious fash-
ion critic who mocks the hat. Archie then worries that Jughead won’t like it
and decides not to give it to him. Here, Archie’s reasons don’t suggest that
his intention was particularly unstable. The closest world where Archie
doesn’t decide to keep the hat isn’t obviously one where he gives Jughead
the hat. It might be one where Archie just isn’t swayed by the critic and
gives Jughead the hat anyway. If it is, CCA entails that Archie’s changing
his mind harms Jughead.6
The same goes for Golf Clubs, which is structurally similar to the fash-
ion critic variant of Hat. The closest world where Batman doesn’t change
his mind isn’t obviously one where Robin doesn’t get the clubs. What
world is closest depends on details like Batman’s reasons for changing his
mind. Suppose that the Joker does something like what the fashion critic
does. Batman’s reasons for changing his mind in such a case don’t suggest
that his intention is especially unstable. The closest world where he doesn’t
change his mind may very well be one where he just isn’t convinced by the
Joker and gives Robin the clubs anyway. If so, CCA entails M. And I think
that’s the right result, for the reasons I’ve given.7
I’ve considered some important differences between the Joker’s actions
and Batman’s actions. These differences don’t show that only the Joker’s
6 In such a case, CCA also entails that Archie’s meeting the fashion critic and the fashion
critic’s mocking the hat harm Jughead. Given such results, Hanser objects that CCA
excessively multiplies harm (2008: 433–4). See Klocksiem (2012: 293) and Bradley
(2012: 405) for good responses.
7 Notice: if we stipulate that the Joker will ensure that Robin doesn’t get the clubs no mat-
ter what Batman does, then CCA doesn’t entail M. If you’re worried that CCA entails
that the Joker’s actions don’t harm Robin in this version of the case (and you think that
they do), see my discussion of the preemption objection below, in sections 4 and 5. My
response to the preemption objection deals with this worry.
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actions harm Robin. Since they seem like the most important differences,
the first objection to my argument for M seems to fail. So I’ll move on to
the second objection.
Recall that the second premise of my argument for M says that the
Joker’s actions harm Robin. In defense of this, I said that the Joker’s
actions harm Robin because they prevent him from getting a benefit. The
second objection to my argument for M says that the Joker’s actions don’t
harm Robin. Klocksiem seems sympathetic to this objection and presses it
in the obvious way. He considers a similar case where an event prevents
someone from getting a trivial benefit. He says that the event doesn’t “ap-
pear to rise to the level of genuine harm” (2012: 294). One might say the
same about the Joker’s actions.
If you think this, I disagree with you. I think that the Joker’s actions
harm Robin, but just a little bit (cf. Boonin 2014: 53, n2). CCA’s fate
doesn’t turn on whether I’m right about this, though. If you think that the
Joker’s actions don’t harm Robin, this gives you a reason to reject M. But
it doesn’t give you a reason to reject CCA. There are at least two ways to
reconcile CCA with the view that the Joker’s actions don’t harm Robin.
One: endorse an account of well being that entails that getting the golf clubs
wouldn’t have made a difference to Robin’s well being (cf. Tadros 2014:
178).8 Two: modify CCA. An obvious way to do that is to say that an
event is overall harmful for a subject iff it makes things go worse by at
least a certain amount for the subject than they otherwise would have gone
for the subject.9 These strategies are compatible. Both can be used to pre-
clude CCA from entailing claims like M in cases like Golf Clubs and Hat.
To some extent, then, they can be used to disarm objections like Bradley’s.
No plausible application of these strategies will completely eliminate such
entailments, though. In variants of the cases involving sufficiently large ben-
efits, CCA will entail claims like M. And that seems like the right result.
Arguments like my argument for M will be harder to reject in such cases.
To sum up the discussion so far, there are good reasons to accept that
CCA sometimes entails claims like M and that claims like M can be true. If
so, the omission objection to CCA isn’t obviously fatal. Intuitions that are
at odds with claims like M are doubtful. I suspect that many who find such
8 Klocksiem is willing to grant that getting the clubs would make Robin better off. He
grants that receiving the trivial benefit in his case would make the subject better off and
that getting the hat would make Jughead better off (2012: 286–7, 293). This concession
is incompatible with the above strategy.
9 This modification is a simple quantitative one. Qualitative modifications are also possi-
ble. Example: an event is overall harmful for a subject iff it makes things go worse in
certain ways for the subject than they otherwise would have gone for the subject. I
doubt that there are any good reasons to accept such a view. But I won’t explore this.
What I say about the quantitative principle applies to lots of qualitative ones too.
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claims counterintuitive are led astray at least partly by our tendency to
moralize harm. This is our tendency to be more likely to call acts harmful if
we think that they’re wrong or motivated by bad intentions.10 At least, this
is a plausible explanation of why one might mistakenly think that actions
like the Joker’s are harmful and action’s like Batman’s aren’t, even when
they have the same effect on a subject’s welfare.11
My reply to the omission objection invites some further objections,
though. I’ll consider them in the next section. Then I’ll deal with the pre-
emption objection.
3. Seriousness and Moral Significance
Maybe I’ve missed something. Maybe the fact that CCA sometimes entails
claims like M is symptomatic of a fatal problem I’ve overlooked. Consider
a variant of Golf Clubs. Suppose Batman intends to give Robin lots of
money and the Joker convinces Batman to change his mind. Assume that
Batman would have given Robin the money had he not changed his mind.
One might object that if the amount of money is large enough, CCA entails
that Batman’s changing his mind seriously harms Robin. One might object
that this is a fatal problem for CCA.
It’s not. The claim that the harm is serious can be understood in two
ways. First, it might be a claim about the harm’s comparative size. It might
mean that the harm is much bigger than in cases where the benefit that
Robin is prevented from getting is much smaller. But that’s unproblematic.
If Robin is harmed here, he’s harmed much more than he is in cases where
the benefit that he’s prevented from getting is much smaller. This isn’t to
say that the harm is especially significant in ways that would make this
result problematic, though. Considering a second interpretation of the seri-
ousness claim makes this clear.
10 Klocksiem falls prey to this tendency. He argues that acts like Archie’s changing his
mind aren’t harmful because it would be supererogatory to give the subject the relevant
benefit (2012: 294).
11 Bradley agrees that moralizing leads our intuitions about harm astray (2012: 410; Nor-
cross 2005: 151). And he argues that we shouldn’t moralize harm (2012: 394–5; cf.
Boonin 2014: 61–5). Moralized accounts fail to count lots of harmful events as harmful.
Counterexamples include non-act events like explosions and earthquakes. They also
include permissible acts done for good reasons, e.g., justifiable uses of lethal force in
self-defense. Comparisons like the following also speak against moralizing harm. “[I]f a
boulder falls on someone, the person is harmed by the boulder’s falling in just the same
way that she would have been harmed by someone’s pushing the boulder on her” (Brad-
ley 2012: 408 n23). Bradley says that the permissibility of the act and the quality of the
agent’s intentions don’t affect whether or how much the subject has been harmed. They
only affect how blameworthy the agent is. I agree. Thanks to an anonymous referee for
pressing me here.
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Second, the claim that the harm is serious could be a claim about the
harm’s moral significance. It might mean that the harm is especially morally
significant, so that there’s a very strong, possibly decisive reason for Batman to
not change his mind. I agree that that claim is false.12 But CCA doesn’t entail
it. CCA is a claim about what makes events harmful. It’s not a claim about the
moral significance of harms or about the strength of reasons not to harm.
Given this, one might object that CCA doesn’t tell us enough about harm.
Some critics object to CCA on such grounds. Matthew Hanser objects to a ver-
sion of CCA on the grounds that a good account of harm should do more than
identify harms. He says that it should be able to classify harms into distinctive
types of varying moral significance (2008: 428). And Seana Shiffrin objects
that CCA doesn’t capture harm’s apparent moral priority: the apparent fact
that, other things equal, our reasons not to harm seem stronger than our reasons
to benefit (2012: 361, 371–2; cf. Harman 2004: 98).
My reply is that it’s not obviously a problem for CCA if it can’t tell us
some important things about harm. Maybe the right theory of harm can only
tell us certain things that we want to know when conjoined with theories about
other things, e.g., well-being, desert, and rights (cf. Bradley 2012: 410). We
might need such theories before we can use CCA to determine the moral sig-
nificance of particular harms and related facts about the strength of reasons
not to impose them. I see no reason to assume that CCA should be able to tell
us such things in isolation from a larger body of moral theory. Obviously, I
don’t have space to elaborate on those other parts of moral theory here.
These remarks invite another objection, though. One might object that harm
is especially morally important and that CCA trivializes harm, or at least that
my defense of CCA does. Bradley and Klocksiem say that popular principles
like Mill’s Harm Principle suggest that harm is especially important, such that
we have strong, perhaps overriding reasons to prevent harm and to avoid harm-
ing (Bradley 2012: 390–1, Klocksiem 2012: 285; cf. Boonin 2014: 84, Harman
2004: 93–4, 2009: 139).13 Call this the Strong View. I think that CCA’s impli-
cations in some cases are inconsistent with this view. That’s not obviously a
problem for CCA, though. Maybe the Strong View is false (cf. Tadros 2014:
176). Maybe some harms aren’t as important as that view predicts. It shouldn’t
be surprising if there are lots of misconceptions about harm. For one thing, the
worst kinds of harm can be the most salient when we’re thinking about harm.
This can make us overlook other kinds of harm and lead our intuitions about
harm astray. For another, philosophers haven’t paid much attention to the nat-
12 Things are different when it comes to the Joker. It seems that the Joker shouldn’t inter-
fere, at least not for the reasons that he would characteristically have for interfering. Not
so for Batman. There are reasons for him not to change his mind. But it seems that they
can be outweighed by other reasons that permit him not to make the sacrifice.
13 Bradley also appeals to the Precautionary Principle and a version of the Hippocratic
Oath. Klocksiem also appeals to W.D. Ross’s statement of the duty of non-maleficence.
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ure of harm. Bradley motivates his entire discussion by emphasizing this:
“Despite the importance harm is supposed to have, almost nobody bothers to
say what it is” (2012: 391).
These observations counsel caution. We shouldn’t quickly reject CCA on
the basis of unexamined assumptions about harm, even if they seem to be widely
shared and seem to motivate popular principles about harm. Consider the princi-
ples that Bradley and Klocksiem appeal to. I think that many popular principles
about harm are oversimplified and overstated, persistently misinterpreted, or
implicitly restricted to certain kinds of harm. TakeMill’s Harm Principle.
The principle requires liberty. . . of doing as we like, subject to such conse-
quences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow creatures, so
long as what we do does not harm them. (Mill 1859: 265)
Many philosophers think that this principle assumes something like the Strong
View. Insofar as one finds the principle and this interpretation of it attractive,
one will be attracted to that view. But many philosophers take issue with the
principle or with common interpretations of it. To take just two examples,
David Brink says that the principle is overly simplistic (2014: S3.6). And Piers
Norris Turner argues that it’s persistently misinterpreted. He argues that the
principle relies on an “expansive” conception of harm that’s consistent with
my position (2014: 300). In light of these controversies, the principle doesn’t
obviously give us good reason to think that CCA or my defense of it misrepre-
sents harm’s moral importance. I think that it’s an open question how impor-
tant harm is, generally speaking. CCA might help us answer that question.
That’s all I’ll say about omissions. To sum up, omission cases don’t pose
obviously fatal problems for CCA. CCA doesn’t entail the unacceptable
claim that one harms merely by failing to benefit. Its implications are nar-
rower. In at least some cases, CCA entails claims like M. These implica-
tions might seem counterintuitive. But there are good reasons to accept
them and to reject contrary intuitions.
I’ll now consider the preemption objection to CCA.
4. Preemption
Bradley also objects to CCA with the following case.
Heart Attack: Batman dies of a heart attack just before he would have
been killed by a flaming cannonball.
Bradley objects to CCA as follows.
[CCA] entails that the heart attack was not harmful to Batman. It didn’t
make things go worse for him. But intuitively, the heart attack was
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harmful. The fact that he would have been harmed by the flaming cannon-
ball anyway does not seem relevant to whether the heart attack was actu-
ally harmful. (2012: 397)
Among others, Molly Gardner (forthcoming: 9), Matthew Hanser (2008:
434–7), Frances Kamm (2014: 504), Michael Rabenberg (2015: 11), and
Seana Shiffrin (2012: 367–8) agree that CCA gets things wrong in preemp-
tion cases.14 I disagree.
With one qualification that I’ll state later, I endorse Klocksiem’s response
to this sort of objection. Klocksiem says that events like the heart attack are
pro tanto harmful, not overall harmful (2012: 295–6). Bradley suggests one
way to understand this distinction (2012: 393–4; cf. Klocksiem 2012: 289-
90; Norcross 2005: 150-1; Purves forthcoming: 18).
• An event e is pro tanto harmful for a subject S iff e has an overall-
harm-making feature for S.
• An event e is overall harmful for a subject S iff e’s pro tanto harms
to S outweigh its pro tanto benefits to S.
I’ll explain this take on the distinction in more detail below. But first, con-
sider an example that will give us an intuitive grip on the distinction (cf.
Harman 2009: 139). Suppose S has invasive live-saving surgery. The sur-
gery is pro tanto harmful for S because it’s invasive. But it’s overall benefi-
cial for S because it’s life-saving. This example shows that pro tanto harm
is a genuine kind of harm and that the concept of pro tanto harm is theoreti-
cally useful. The invasiveness is a pro tanto harmful feature of the surgery.
It’s a pro tanto reason against performing the surgery and a pro tanto reason
to do things like develop and use comparably effective non-invasive treat-
ments. This reason can make performing the surgery wrong when such
alternatives are available or when the surgery doesn’t have outweighing
benefits for the patient (cf. Boonin 2014: 84).
Now, consider Bradley’s suggested take on the distinction. It needs some
unpacking. Consider the claim that an event is pro tanto harmful for S iff it
has an overall-harm-making feature for S. What’s an overall-harm-making
14 They discuss different kinds of cases than Bradley’s. In their cases, an agent’s free act
preempts another agent’s free act. Their cases are also different from Norcross’s case,
discussed below. In that case an agent acts in a way that preempts another act that he
would otherwise perform. As we’ll see, a version of Norcross’s case raises a serious
problem for CCA. My solution avoids it. But my solution gives the same verdict in
Gardner’s, Hanser’s, Kamm’s, Rabenberg’s, and Shiffrin’s cases that CCA gives in Heart
Attack. I think this is the right verdict for the same reason that it’s the right verdict in
Heart Attack. See the discussion below and in section 5.
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feature for S?15 I endorse a variant of Bradley’s view from his earlier work.
Here’s his view (2009: 66).
PTH An event e is pro tanto harmful for a subject S iff:
1) e is intrinsically bad for S, or
2) e brings about something intrinsically bad for S, or
3) e prevents something intrinsically good for S.
PTH is a list of overall-harm-making features for S. Theories of well-being
will tell us what things are intrinsically good or bad for S. I said that I
endorse a variant of PTH because it seems like PTH can’t adequately deal
with certain overdetermination and preemption cases. Here’s an overdeter-
mination case.
S is shot twice simultaneously. S is killed instantly and painlessly. Each
shot alone would have had this effect.
Since the shots kill S, each shot seems pro tanto harmful for S. But PTH
doesn’t obviously entail this.16 When death or events that cause it are pro
tanto harmful for a subject, it’s at least partly because they satisfy PTH’s
condition 3, i.e., because they deprive the subject of future benefits. But nei-
ther shot does this. Each is such that, had it not occurred, S would have
been killed anyway. So, PTH seems to go wrong in this case. Preemption
cases like the following raise the same problem.
Event e1 kills subject S instantly and painlessly. Another event e2 would
otherwise have had the same effect moments later. S would have lived had
neither event occurred.
e1 seems pro tanto harmful for S. But again, PTH doesn’t obviously entail
this. Something similar applies to Heart Attack. Batman’s heart attack satis-
fies condition 2, assuming that it’s painful. But that’s not the only reason
why it’s pro tanto harmful for him. It also seems pro tanto harmful for him
because it kills him.
I suspect that the most promising way to deal with these problems for
PTH is with an account of plural harm. Such an account says when multiple
events together are overall harmful for a subject. Neil Feit (2015) defends a
15 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me here.
16 PTH will entail this if we combine it with a theory of well-being on which mere bodily
damage is intrinsically bad for a subject. I won’t assume such a theory, though. Even if
such a theory is true, PTH still can’t account for all the ways in which the shots are pro
tanto harmful for S. See the next sentence.
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sophisticated and attractive account. I won’t discuss its details or try to
defend it here, though.17 I mention it only because such accounts suggest
that we should add another condition to PTH. We should also say that an
event e is pro tanto harmful for a subject S if something like the following
is true.
4) e is one among a group of events that together satisfy at least one
of PTH’s other conditions.
With this addition, we can say that the heart attack is pro tanto harmful for
Batman because it’s one among a group of events that together deprive him
of future benefits. The heart attack is part of this group because it kills Bat-
man. The events involving the cannonball are part of this group because
they would have killed him had the heart attack not done so.
So much for pro tanto harm. Next, consider the claim that an event e is
overall harmful for a subject S iff its pro tanto harms to S outweigh its pro
tanto benefits to S. This doesn’t make clear how pro tanto harms can out-
weigh pro tanto benefits. So here’s a clearer, if cumbersome way to put it.18
An event e is overall harmful for a subject S iff the sum of e’s intrinsic
badness for S, the intrinsic badness for S of what e brings about, and the
intrinsic goodness for S of what e prevents outweighs the sum of e’s
intrinsic goodness for S, the intrinsic goodness for S of what e brings
about, and the intrinsic badness for S of what e prevents.
Now, let’s reconsider Heart Attack in light of the above discussion. I
said that, subject to a qualification, the heart attack is pro tanto harmful
for Batman but not overall harmful for him. PTH and the above take on
overall harm explain why CCA entails this and why this is a plausible
result.
The heart attack is pro tanto harmful for Batman because it satisfies
PTH’s conditions 2 and 4. It satisfies 2 because it causes him pain. It satis-
fies 4 because it’s one among a group of events that together are overall
harmful for him. The heart attack itself isn’t overall harmful for him,
though. It’s not obviously intrinsically bad for him. Nor does it prevent any-
thing intrinsically good for him, since he would have died moments later
anyway. And though it causes him pain, which is intrinsically bad for him,
it presumably also prevents the cannonball from doing so. This is where the
17 One of the most important details of such an account is how it identifies the events that
together harm subjects. A good account will avoid being overinclusive or underinclusive.
That is, it won’t include too many or too few events as members of the harmful group.
Feit’s proposal is attractive in this respect (2015: 371, 374–9).
18 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me here.
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qualification that I mentioned comes in. Whether the heart attack is overall
harmful for Batman depends on whether it causes him more or less pain
than it prevents. If, as seems plausible, it causes him as much or less pain
than the cannonball would have, then it’s not overall harmful for him and
may even be overall beneficial for him. However, if it preempts a less pain-
ful death, then it is overall harmful for him.19
These results are plausible. The claim that the heart attack is pro tanto
harmful for Batman accounts for our intuitions about the case. It accounts
for our intuition that the heart attack harms Batman, since pro tanto harm is
a genuine kind of harm. And it accounts for the intuition that there’s some-
thing about the case that makes the heart attack different. Since Batman
would have been killed anyway, the heart attack doesn’t seem to matter in
the same way that it does in a case where he otherwise would have lived.
Bradley explains this by appealing to the claim that harm is prudentially
important (2012: 406). Suppose Batman knew that he was going to be
killed either way. Would he care if he died of a heart attack instead of a
cannonball strike? Bradley says that he probably wouldn’t and shouldn’t
care.20 Bradley grants that this supports the claim that the heart attack isn’t
overall harmful.
In light of this, Bradley grants that my response to the preemption objec-
tion has some plausibility. Despite this, he thinks that the response fails. To
show this, he appeals to a case discussed by Alastair Norcross (cf. Norcross
2005: 165–66).
Dark Knight: Bobby Knight gets mad at a philosopher, Phil, in response
to a perceived slight. So he chokes Phil. Luckily for Phil, Knight is in
anger management. It’s taught him to better control his behavior. He
choked Phil because he applied anger management techniques. If he
hadn’t, he would have dismembered Phil.
CCA entails that Knight’s choking Phil is overall beneficial for Phil, assum-
ing that we treat benefit and harm analogously (I’ll assume this throughout).
Here’s Bradley again.
This case seems to show that according to [CCA], one can make one’s
pain-causing actions overall beneficial rather than harmful merely by
19 If things other than pain are also intrinsically bad for subjects and if such things are
implicated in this case, the above points can be put in terms of those other things too.
Bodily damage might be intrinsically bad for subjects, say. Harman might be working
with such a view (2004: 91–2, 97, 2009: 139; cf. Boonin 2014: 75).
20 This must be qualified in light of my remarks above. Batman should and probably would
care about whether the heart attack kills him in a more or less painful way. But he
shouldn’t and probably wouldn’t care about the mere fact that it kills him, since he’d
otherwise die moments later anyway.
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becoming a rage-filled lunatic who would otherwise have done much
worse things. This is hard to square with our ordinary practice of harm
attribution. . . [It] seems that there is serious overall harm here. (2012:
407)
Klocksiem doesn’t discuss this case. Feit does and he thinks that his
account of plural harm can deal with it. But his account entails that
the choking is overall beneficial for Batman rather than overall harm-
ful for him (2015: 381; cf. Boonin 2014: 62–3). Norcross offers a
solution to the problem that the case raises for CCA, but he says that
his solution makes the concept of harm useless for moral theory.21 I
think that there’s a better way to deal with the case. My solution
doesn’t make harm a useless concept and it doesn’t entail that the
choking is overall beneficial for Batman. I’ll present it in the next
section.
5. Freedom
To deal with Dark Knight, we must clarify some of its details first.
Bradley likens Knight to a rage-filled lunatic. Norcross frames things
in term of Knight’s attempts to control his behavior. These character-
izations invite confusion about something important: how much con-
trol Knight has over his behavior. Suppose that he has very little
control. He’s overcome by rage and the only way that he can pre-
vent himself from dismembering Phil is by choking Phil. If so,
CCA’s verdict seems right. Knight’s choking Phil is overall benefi-
cial for Phil.22 Dark Knight is only a problem for CCA if Knight
21 Here’s his view: Act A harms subject S iff S is worse off as a result of A than S
would have been if the appropriate alternative to A had been performed instead
(2005: 169). Norcross says that conversational context determines what the appropri-
ate alternative is by making some alternatives especially salient. But he doesn’t spell
out the details of this view (2005: 171). Whatever the details, he thinks that on this
view “harm and benefit do not have the kind of metaphysical grounding required to
play fundamental roles in ethical theory, nor do judgments of harm and benefit make
any distinctive contribution to reasons for action” (2005: 171). Bradley calls this a
contrastive account and says that it fails to make harm normatively important (2012:
407–8, 410).
22 If you’re skeptical, consider another case. You anger me and I start turning
into the Hulk. If I do nothing, I’ll transform, lose control, and smash you. The
only way that I can prevent this is by locking you in a nearby basement where
you’ll be out of sight. So I do that, roughing you up in the process because you
ignore my warnings and resist. CCA entails that my action is overall beneficial for
you. And that verdict seems right. There are no relevant differences between this
case and the out of control version of the Knight case that support different
verdicts.
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has more control over his behavior. So I’ll stipulate that Knight
would freely do whatever he does: he freely chokes Phil and would
have freely dismembered Phil otherwise.23 Given this stipulation,
CCA’s verdict is highly counterintuitive.
We can avoid this result by using a different counterfactual compar-
ison than the one that CCA uses. We should compare how well off Phil
is after Knight chokes him to how well off he would have been had
Knight not tried to hurt him at all. There are two reasons to use this
comparison. First, choking Phil and dismembering Phil are different ways
for Knight to do the same thing for the same reasons. They’re both
attempts by Knight to hurt Phil (see my discussion of intentions below
for more on this). Second, Knight’s actual and counterfactual acts are
free. Because of this we assume that, at the point of decision, he could
have refrained from trying to hurt Phil. This follows from an assumption
that we make about free will: that when agents act freely, they could
have acted otherwise. Since Knight acted freely and could have refrained
from trying to hurt Phil, we should use a comparison where he so
refrains. That gets the intuitively right result. And it does so in an intu-
itively attractive way. To illustrate, the reasons that I’ve appealed to are
reasons why the choking is prudentially important for Phil. Phil has good
reasons to prefer not to have been choked by Knight, despite what
Knight would otherwise have done. This is because Knight could have
refrained from trying to hurt him and because Phil would have been bet-
ter off had Knight so refrained.
These considerations suggest a way to revise the counterfactual compara-
tive account. Since the reasons that I’ve given for using a different compar-
ison in Dark Knight don’t apply to mere events, we should say that CCA
only applies to mere events and that a different principle applies to free
acts.24 I propose this:
23 Some philosophers think that counterfactuals of freedom like this have no truth-value.
I’m sympathetic to this view, but won’t discuss it. Even if it’s right, counterfactuals
about what agents would probably freely do could be true. My discussion can be framed
in such terms. So framed, the counterfactual comparative account’s implications are
more complicated. In cases involving free acts, it will entail that certain acts and events
are probably harmful or beneficial.
24 Bradley says that accounts of harm should be ontologically neutral. Initially, he says that
accounts are ontologically neutral if they count both acts and non-act events as harmful
and if they recognize that different sorts of beings can be harmed, not just typical human
adults (2012: 394–5). I agree that accounts of harm should be neutral in these ways. My
view is. But Bradley later says that accounts that treat acts and non-act events differently
aren’t ontologically neutral (2012: 408). I don’t think that accounts of harm should be
neutral in this way. The reasons that I’ve given above are good reasons to treat acts and
non-acts differently.
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CCA+ An agent’s free act is overall harmful for a subject S iff S is
better off in the closest possible world where the agent doesn’t
freely perform an act of that type than S is as a result of the act.25
Call the conjunction of CCA and CCA+ the Revised Counterfactual Com-
parative Account of Harm or simply the revised account. I’ll discuss how
to apply it in a moment, focusing specifically on how to classify free acts
as acts of certain types. Then, I’ll argue that it gets the right results in vari-
ous cases.
But first I need to make a qualification. When I gave reasons to use a differ-
ent comparison in Dark Knight, I appealed to an assumption: that when agents
act freely, they could have acted otherwise. This is a controversial claim about
free will. I think that it’s true. But I won’t defend it. If you reject it, take me to
be trying to show how those who accept it should revise the counterfactual
comparative account to deal with Dark Knight. If the assumption is false, I’d
say that no revisions are needed because CCA gets the right result in Dark
Knight. I’d say that Bradley’s objection fails because it appeals to mistaken
intuitions produced by the assumption.
Now I’ll discuss how to apply the revised account. An obvious objection
to it says that there’s no good way to classify free acts for CCA+’s pur-
poses. Hanser levels such an objection against a similar principle meant to
accommodate his intuition that events like Batman’s heart attack are overall
harmful.26 Hanser doubts that there’s a way to classify events as relevantly
similar that doesn’t presuppose an account of harm. You might have similar
suspicions about CCA+ and about my claim that choking Phil and dismem-
bering Phil are different ways for Knight to do the same thing.
The suspicions are unfounded. We can classify free acts in the needed way
without presupposing an account of harm. We can do this by looking at the
agent’s intentions. When Knight chokes Phil, he acts on various intentions
such as an intention to hurt Phil. So here’s an initial proposal.
25 I don’t really have to formulate a different principle. Alternatively, I could modify CCA
as follows: An event e is overall harmful for a subject S iff S is better off in the closest
relevant possible world where e doesn’t occur than S is as a result of e. I could then say
that the relevance criteria for mere events are different than those for free acts (and spell
out the latter by appealing to intentions; see below). I prefer putting things in terms of
CCA+ for ease of exposition, though—and because CCA+ is based on an assumption
about free will that some will reject. If you reject the assumption, see below. If the
assumption is true, we’ll also need variants of PTH and of my explanation of Bradley’s
take on overall harm. These variants will have modified prevention clauses. They’ll
determine what an agent’s free act prevents by looking at the closest possible world
where the agent doesn’t freely perform an act of that type.
26 Here’s the principle: An event e is overall harmful for a subject S iff e makes S worse
off than S would have been had neither e nor any relevantly similar event occurred
(Hanser 2008: 435).
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For any free act that an agent performs, the intentions that she acts on con-
stitute types under which we can classify the act for the purpose of harm
assessment.
Suppose that Knight choked Phil because Knight intended to hurt him. Phil
would have been better off had Knight not tried to hurt him. So on the ini-
tial proposal the revised account entails that Knight’s choking Phil overall
harms Phil.
Unfortunately, the initial proposal doesn’t work. Knight intended to
hurt Phil. But he also intended to restrain himself. He choked Phil
instead of dismembering Phil. So his act counts as an act of restraint on
the proposal. Had Knight not restrained himself, Phil would have been
worse off because Knight would have dismembered him. So on this pro-
posal the revised account still entails the counterintuitive claim that
Knight’s choking Phil overall benefits Phil. Even worse, on this proposal
the revised account yields contradictory implications. Knight’s choking
Phil is overall beneficial for Phil because it’s an act of restraint. And it’s
overall harmful for him because it’s an attempt to hurt him.
Fortunately, we can improve the initial proposal. To classify the choking,
we must account for some important details about Knight’s intentions. Some
of the intentions that he acts on are more fundamental than others in the sense
that they have a motivational priority that the others don’t have. Knight’s
intention to hurt Phil is more fundamental in this sense than his intention to
restrain himself. One way to see this is by trying to explain Knight’s actual
and counterfactual behavior. Why does he choke Phil? Why would he other-
wise have dismembered Phil? And why does he restrain himself in the way
that he does, i.e., not so much that he doesn’t try to hurt Phil at all? Answer:
because he intends to hurt Phil and because this intention is fundamental in
the above sense. We can’t give a fully satisfactory explanation of Knight’s
actual and counterfactual behavior without acknowledging this fact. This sug-
gests a way to improve the initial proposal about how to classify free acts. We
can avoid the problems with that proposal by modifying it as follows.
For any free act that an agent performs, the fundamental intentions that
she acts on constitute types under which we can classify the act for the
purpose of harm assessment.
This proposal classifies Knight’s choking Phil as an attempt to hurt Phil,
not as an act of restraint. On this proposal the revised account gets the right
result: Knight’s choking Phil is overall harmful for Phil.
This improved proposal coheres well with our intuitions about how best
to describe Knight’s act for the purpose of harm assessment. For that pur-
pose, it’s inaccurate and disingenuous to simply call Knight’s choking Phil
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an act of restraint. Doing that omits crucial details about the nature of the
restraint and about the overall character of Knight’s intentions. Classifying
Knight’s act as an attempt to hurt Phil doesn’t do that. On this improved
proposal, the revised account is a promising way to deal with the problem
that Dark Knight raises for CCA. At least, it’s promising given the revised
account’s assumption about free will.
Moreover, the account seems to have plausible results in the other cases
that I’ve discussed.27 For example, CCA+ seems to have the same results in
cases like Golf Clubs and Hat that I defended earlier. That said, you might
be skeptical about the account’s ability to deal with other cases. Recall the
case where Batman considers giving Robin the Batmobile and decides not
to. I argued that CCA doesn’t obviously entail that Batman’s decision
harms Robin. But you might worry that CCA+ has unacceptable results in
this case.28 Suppose that Batman’s fundamental intention is to keep the Bat-
mobile. You might object that CCA+ entails that Batman’s decision harms
Robin because Robin would have gotten the Batmobile had Batman not
acted with that intention. This objection fails, though. My earlier defense
still works. The closest world where Batman doesn’t act on an intention to
keep the Batmobile isn’t obviously one where he acts on an intention to
give Robin the Batmobile. As before, the closest such world may be one
where Batman remains indecisive, forgets to decide, or never consider giv-
ing Robin the Batmobile at all.
In light of all this, the revised account seems promising. However, there
are some especially challenging objections to it. I’ll discuss two in the next
section.
6. Two Objections to the Revised Account
The first objection to the revised account focuses on CCA+’s appeal to fun-
damental intentions. Consider the following case.29
Dark Knight 2: Knight wants to steal Phil’s life savings. Knight knows
that the only way he would refrain from freely doing so is by kicking
Phil. If he does that, he’ll feel sorry for Phil and refrain from freely
stealing Phil’s savings. So Knight freely kicks Phil with the fundamen-
tal intention of preventing himself from freely stealing Phil’s savings.
27 This is one reason to think that the addition of CCA+ isn’t just an ad hoc way of deal-
ing with Dark Knight. The reasons that I gave for treating free acts differently are also
reasons to think that the account isn’t ad hoc. Thanks to an anonymous referee for rais-
ing this worry.
28 Thanks to an audience member at the Central States Philosophical Association for this
worry.
29 Thanks to Eric Vogelstein for this objection.
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Had Knight not done that, he would have freely stolen Phil’s savings
with the fundamental intention of enriching himself.
The objection claims that the kicking and the stealing can’t be classified as
acts of the same type, since the fundamental intentions for them are differ-
ent. Because of this, the objection concludes, the revised account entails the
counterintuitive claim that the kicking is overall beneficial and merely pro
tanto harmful for Phil.
The crucial detail here is that kicking Phil is the only way that Knight
would refrain from stealing from Phil. But why is this the only way?
There seem to be two possibilities here. One is that Knight lacks a sig-
nificant degree of control now over what he would freely do later—
hence the talk of preventing himself from stealing Phil’s savings. If so,
CCA+ does entail that Knight’s kicking Phil is overall beneficial and
merely pro tanto harmful for Phil. But that’s the right result. If the case
involves a significant lack of control, it’s like a case where Knight kicks
Phil because that’s the only way to prevent someone else from freely
stealing Phil’s savings. Kicking Phil is overall beneficial and merely pro
tanto harmful for Phil in such a case.
Alternatively, the only way claim might be true because Knight is
willing to refrain from stealing from Phil only if he kicks Phil. If so,
the objection’s description of Knight’s intentions is wrong. Knight’s
intention to prevent himself from stealing Phil’s savings isn’t fundamen-
tal—much like his intention to restrain himself in Norcross’s case. His
fundamental intention is actually something like this: to either steal from
Phil or kick Phil (or maybe it’s like this: to either enrich himself at
Phil’s expense or hurt Phil; the basic point is that fundamental intentions
can be more complex than the objection assumes). CCA+ entails that
Knight harms Phil overall when he freely performs an act of that type,
i.e., a stealing-or-kicking. Had Knight not freely performed an act of that
type, he wouldn’t have freely kicked Phil or freely stolen from Phil.
And Phil would have been better off.
So here’s my general response to problem cases like Dark Knight 2.
In such cases, there are two possibilities. One: the agent’s fundamental
intentions for her actual and counterfactual free acts are really the same.
They’re just more complex than the objection assumes. Two: the agent
lacks control in an important way. I suspect that a genuine divergence
of fundamental intentions is symptomatic of such a lack of control. On
the first possibility, the revised account entails that the agent’s free act is
overall harmful for the subject. On the second, the account entails that
the agent’s free act is overall beneficial and merely pro tanto harmful for
the subject. Either way, the account gets the right results.
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The second objection to the revised account exploits the fact that the
account treats free acts and mere events differently.30 Consider another
case.
Dark Knight 3: Knight gets mad at Phil and wants to hurt him. Knight
throws a chair at him, causing the chair to fly towards him and hit him.
Knight would have freely dismembered Phil had Knight not thrown a chair
at him.
CCA+ applies to Knight’s free act and counts it as overall harmful. But
CCA applies to the mere events of the chair flying towards Phil and the
chair hitting Phil. The objection says that CCA counts these mere events
as overall beneficial and merely pro tanto harmful for Phil because Knight
would have dismembered Phil had they not occurred. The objection claims
that this result is unacceptable because the events are overall harmful for
Phil.
Again, there are two ways of filling in the details here. On the first, the
revised account doesn’t have the implications that the objection says it
does. On the second, it does have those implications, but those implica-
tions are right. To see this, examine the mere events of the chair flying
towards Phil and the chair hitting Phil. Consider each event by itself and
the closest possible world where it doesn’t occur. What happens in those
worlds? What happens, I think, is that Knight tries to throw the chair at
Phil and fails somehow. Maybe his aim is off and the chair misses Phil.
Maybe his grip is bad and the chair tumbles off harmlessly. Whatever the
case, the revised account’s implications seem to depend on what Knight
would do in response to things going wrong in such ways.
There are two possibilities here. Possibility one: Knight would do
nothing. Maybe merely trying to hit Phil with the chair assuages
Knight’s anger. If so, the revised account doesn’t have the implications
that the objection claims. The account entails that the flying and the hit-
ting are overall harmful for Phil because Phil would have been better off
had they not occurred. Possibility two: Knight would have freely dis-
membered Phil. If so, the revised account does entail that the flying and
the hitting are overall beneficial and merely pro tanto harmful for Phil.
But that’s the right result. If Knight would have freely dismembered Phil
had those events not occurred, then they’re overall beneficial because
they prevent the dismemberment. By contrast, Knight’s free act of chair
throwing isn’t like that. It doesn’t prevent the dismemberment. That’s
partly why it’s overall harmful. We can appeal to this difference to
30 Thanks again to Eric Vogelstein for this objection.
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justify the different assessments.31 The revised account gets the right
results here.
You might think that this case can be modified to forestall this response,
though. Suppose that Knight wouldn’t miss because he’s an expert chair
thrower. So, if the flying or hitting hadn’t occurred, it would have to have
been because Knight didn’t throw the chair and simply dismembered Phil
instead. If so, the flying and the hitting don’t prevent the dismemberment.
They just correlate with its non-occurrence. So the objection resurfaces.
Intuitively, the flying and the hitting are overall harmful for Phil in this
variant of this case. But CCA counts them as overall beneficial and merely
pro tanto harmful for Phil.
I agree that in this variant of the case the flying and the hitting are over-
all harmful for Phil. But the revised account can yield this result if it’s com-
bined with a plausible view of the distinction between free acts and mere
events. We should say that the flying and the hitting don’t count as mere
events and that they’re actually part of Knight’s free act. This is because,
given Knight’s expertise at chair throwing, he brings these events about by
exerting a degree of control that suffices for them to count as part of his
free act. To illustrate: for the revised account’s purposes, these events are
sufficiently like my arm raising after I’ve willed it to raise under normal
conditions. Under such conditions, my arm raising is part of my free act.
Given Knight’s chair-throwing expertise, the same goes for the relevant
events in this case. So the events are covered by CCA+ and the revised
account yields the right result about them: they’re overall harmful for Phil.
To put the reply in general terms: the revised account can adequately
deal with cases like this if it’s combined with a view of free acts that uses
the concept of control to distinguish free acts from mere events. No doubt,
formulating such a view requires working out some important details. But I
won’t try to do that here. I’ve said enough to show that the objection at
issue isn’t obviously fatal to the revised account.
7. Conclusion
The omission and preemption objections to CCA don’t raise obviously fatal
problems for it. Certain preemption cases show that CCA can’t adequately
account for the harmfulness of free acts, given an important assumption
about free will. Even if we don’t want to reject this assumption, there’s a
promising solution to this problem. We should supplement CCA with
31 Note that appealing to this difference to justify the different assessments is consistent
with my earlier argument for M. In Golf Clubs, there’s no relevant difference between
the Joker’s actions and Batman’s changing his mind. Both have the same effect on
Robin. By contrast, there’s a relevant difference between Knight’s act and the mere
events that follow: they affect Phil in different ways.
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another principle that treats free acts differently from mere events. I’ve pro-
posed such a principle and defended my revised account from some impor-
tant objections.32
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